I know you are just using the 50% 100% as an example, and not actually endorsing it, but I wanted to point out a serious problem with it. It implies that it is better to create someone who experiences (for example) 1 unit of pain and 2 units of pleasure, than it is to create someone who experiences 100 units of pain and 190 units of pleasure over their lifetimes. However, assuming that individuals value the two equally, most people would rather be the later than the former.
Still, I think the arguments for a hybrid standard are quite interesting and convincing, even if the axiology of your specific example could use some refinement!
Interesting stuff. Just skimmed it and I’ll be back to read it a second time so I can think about this more. My sense--and this is an observation, not an actual argument--is that anti-natalism is often a reflection of its proponent’s underlying psychological disposition towards life. I would grant that this is true of most philosophies, but I think it is true of anti-natalism more than most. That said, I’ve only read a few essays on the topic and heard Benatar speak a few times so I’m no expert on the literature. Thanks for writing.
I think this is exactly right! And I think this allows for a very strong objection to the asymmetry--if there's an asymmetry, you should constantly be very happy that bad things happened and that you did something deeply wrong. It seems bizarre that the asymmetry is committed to the claim that
a) procreation is deeply wrong
b) you should, after you procreate, not regret the deeply wrong, terrible action that you did.
Notably, this problem applies to any partialist view--including yours, Richard. Suppose that you create a person with 50 utils and this deprives an existing person of 45 utils. When you do that action, it's wrong, but once they exist, their well-being is just as important, so you should feel regret about that, on your account, it would seem.
It actually seems perfectly plausible to me that changing who exists (even in bad or morally mistaken ways) could change how we should subsequently feel about that decision. Liz Harman is very good on this point, in her "'I'll be Glad I Did It' Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires": https://philpapers.org/rec/HARIBG-3
I'll read the paper, but that seems very odd. Imagine you read about some act that causes current suffering to create a current person with well-being. You're asked how to feel about that act. It seems strange to answer "wait, what year was that act taken? Has the kid been born yet?"
It's a tricky question precisely *when* we should get attached to actual people. It may be more plausible to track, not *time* (or whether the future person has come into existence yet), but just *whether the action has happened* (such that the future person's existence is now settled). I'm not sure.
But the basic phenomenon of *attachment* seems familiar enough, and not odd. Just consider a parent considering the counterfactual prospect of having had a slightly happier child in place of their actual child. In advance, they should of course prefer a happier child over a less happy one, all else equal. But at least once they know & love their actual child, it would seem messed up for them to wish that a slightly happier alternative person had existed instead.
So, if we are to accommodate the phenomenon of (warranted) attachment, we must be open to the possibility of shifting normative standards pre- vs post-attachment.
Benatar is notoriously difficult to interpret, and I think Draper's argument rests on a misinterpretation. Benatar would deny the "Fundamental Asymmetry." This, in particular:
"For any possible subject S of pain and pleasure, S's pain has unconditional intrinsic disvalue"
Benatar says the goodness of the absence of pain for the never-existent is not an intrinsic good, but is rather a "relative" (or purely comparative) good. He isn't very clear about this in "Better Never to Have Been," (though I think it's possible to find him saying this even there) but he is clear about this in his response to Skott Brill in "Every Conceivable Harm: a Further Defense of Anti-Natalism" (2012).
On page 144 of that, he writes:
"Professor Brill seems to think that I deny that the non-badness in quadrant (4) [the absence of pleasure for the never-existent] is intrinsic non-badness. However, that is a mistaken account of my view. The absence of pleasure in the non-existent is indeed intrinsically neither good nor bad. It is intrinsically value-neutral. However, the intrinsic value (including value-neutrality) of something does not preclude a different relative value. Thus the pain in (1) [pain for the existent] is intrinsically bad, but also relatively bad, in comparison with (3) [the absence of pain for the never existent] for example. Similarly, I take (3) [the absence of pain for the never existent] to be intrinsically neutral, but relatively good – that is, better than (2) [sic. Benatar means (1)]. And I take the non-badness of (4) [the absence of pleasure for the never-existent] to be both intrinsic and relative. The absent pleasure is intrinsically neither good nor bad, but it is also not worse than the presence of pleasure in (2) [the presence of pleasure for the existent]. That said, it is true that when I describe (4) as “not bad” I am not referring to its intrinsic value, and am instead referring to its being “not worse” than (2), as that is what is key to the comparison of existence and non-existence."
If pain has unconditional intrinsic disvalue, as the Fundamental Asymmetry claims, then it follows that the *absence* of pain -- as the absence of an unconditional intrinsic bad -- is *comparatively* good, which is just what Benatar also holds.
I don't think anyone here is claiming that the absence of pain is intrinsically (non-comparatively) good -- that would be a bizarre claim.
Okay, I think I understand the claim now, thanks! I still don't know if Benatar needs to accept the Fundamental Asymmetry. Do you think he's committed to it? Does Benatar need to say that pain has intrinsic disvalue even if no one exists to experience it, in order to be able to say that it's better for a possible person that they aren't existing and feeling pain?
I think the four propositions you set out as part of his "response to Brill" are collectively equivalent to the Fundamental Asymmetry. (One could imagine an alternative view which spoke purely of "goodness for", not intrinsic value/disvalue, but such a view would struggle to explain the comparative goodness of preventing miserable life, since in the empty world there is nobody for whom it is comparatively better.)
I agree that alternative view would struggle for the reason you say, but to me, that seems to be the route Benatar goes. In "Better Never to Have Been," he seems to endorse the alternative view on p. 4 and p. 31. In "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics," he seems to endorse the alternative view in greater detail, on pages 125–6.
On pages 41-42 of the digital version of "Better Never to Have Been," Benatar says that the not-badness of the absence of pleasure for the never existent is a comparative not-badness rather than an intrinsic one, and that the badness of the absence of pleasure for the existent is a comparative rather intrinsic badness. This strongly implies that the absence of pain for the never-existent is a purely comparative goodness rather than an intrinsic one, but that requires reading between the lines. I'm not sure if he's more clear about this elsewhere in "Better Never to Have Been." But, again, he is clear about this in his response to Brill.
In his response to Brill, he endorses the following:
1) pain is intrinsically bad
2) pleasure is intrinsically good
3) the absence of pain for the never-existent is intrinsically neutral and is better than the presence of pain for the existent
4) the absence of pleasure for the never existent is intrinsically neutral and is not worse than the presence of pleasure for the existent
This is how he should have written his asymmetry from the beginning. It would have avoided a lot of confusion.
No, that reply just seems to bite the bullet, brutely asserting disagreement while citing a bunch of fellow-travellers whose theories commit them to doing likewise. It offers no actual *reason* to deny my "Awesome Lives" premise.
I know you are just using the 50% 100% as an example, and not actually endorsing it, but I wanted to point out a serious problem with it. It implies that it is better to create someone who experiences (for example) 1 unit of pain and 2 units of pleasure, than it is to create someone who experiences 100 units of pain and 190 units of pleasure over their lifetimes. However, assuming that individuals value the two equally, most people would rather be the later than the former.
Still, I think the arguments for a hybrid standard are quite interesting and convincing, even if the axiology of your specific example could use some refinement!
Interesting stuff. Just skimmed it and I’ll be back to read it a second time so I can think about this more. My sense--and this is an observation, not an actual argument--is that anti-natalism is often a reflection of its proponent’s underlying psychological disposition towards life. I would grant that this is true of most philosophies, but I think it is true of anti-natalism more than most. That said, I’ve only read a few essays on the topic and heard Benatar speak a few times so I’m no expert on the literature. Thanks for writing.
I think this is exactly right! And I think this allows for a very strong objection to the asymmetry--if there's an asymmetry, you should constantly be very happy that bad things happened and that you did something deeply wrong. It seems bizarre that the asymmetry is committed to the claim that
a) procreation is deeply wrong
b) you should, after you procreate, not regret the deeply wrong, terrible action that you did.
Notably, this problem applies to any partialist view--including yours, Richard. Suppose that you create a person with 50 utils and this deprives an existing person of 45 utils. When you do that action, it's wrong, but once they exist, their well-being is just as important, so you should feel regret about that, on your account, it would seem.
It actually seems perfectly plausible to me that changing who exists (even in bad or morally mistaken ways) could change how we should subsequently feel about that decision. Liz Harman is very good on this point, in her "'I'll be Glad I Did It' Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires": https://philpapers.org/rec/HARIBG-3
I'll read the paper, but that seems very odd. Imagine you read about some act that causes current suffering to create a current person with well-being. You're asked how to feel about that act. It seems strange to answer "wait, what year was that act taken? Has the kid been born yet?"
It's a tricky question precisely *when* we should get attached to actual people. It may be more plausible to track, not *time* (or whether the future person has come into existence yet), but just *whether the action has happened* (such that the future person's existence is now settled). I'm not sure.
But the basic phenomenon of *attachment* seems familiar enough, and not odd. Just consider a parent considering the counterfactual prospect of having had a slightly happier child in place of their actual child. In advance, they should of course prefer a happier child over a less happy one, all else equal. But at least once they know & love their actual child, it would seem messed up for them to wish that a slightly happier alternative person had existed instead.
So, if we are to accommodate the phenomenon of (warranted) attachment, we must be open to the possibility of shifting normative standards pre- vs post-attachment.
Benatar is notoriously difficult to interpret, and I think Draper's argument rests on a misinterpretation. Benatar would deny the "Fundamental Asymmetry." This, in particular:
"For any possible subject S of pain and pleasure, S's pain has unconditional intrinsic disvalue"
Benatar says the goodness of the absence of pain for the never-existent is not an intrinsic good, but is rather a "relative" (or purely comparative) good. He isn't very clear about this in "Better Never to Have Been," (though I think it's possible to find him saying this even there) but he is clear about this in his response to Skott Brill in "Every Conceivable Harm: a Further Defense of Anti-Natalism" (2012).
On page 144 of that, he writes:
"Professor Brill seems to think that I deny that the non-badness in quadrant (4) [the absence of pleasure for the never-existent] is intrinsic non-badness. However, that is a mistaken account of my view. The absence of pleasure in the non-existent is indeed intrinsically neither good nor bad. It is intrinsically value-neutral. However, the intrinsic value (including value-neutrality) of something does not preclude a different relative value. Thus the pain in (1) [pain for the existent] is intrinsically bad, but also relatively bad, in comparison with (3) [the absence of pain for the never existent] for example. Similarly, I take (3) [the absence of pain for the never existent] to be intrinsically neutral, but relatively good – that is, better than (2) [sic. Benatar means (1)]. And I take the non-badness of (4) [the absence of pleasure for the never-existent] to be both intrinsic and relative. The absent pleasure is intrinsically neither good nor bad, but it is also not worse than the presence of pleasure in (2) [the presence of pleasure for the existent]. That said, it is true that when I describe (4) as “not bad” I am not referring to its intrinsic value, and am instead referring to its being “not worse” than (2), as that is what is key to the comparison of existence and non-existence."
If pain has unconditional intrinsic disvalue, as the Fundamental Asymmetry claims, then it follows that the *absence* of pain -- as the absence of an unconditional intrinsic bad -- is *comparatively* good, which is just what Benatar also holds.
I don't think anyone here is claiming that the absence of pain is intrinsically (non-comparatively) good -- that would be a bizarre claim.
Okay, I think I understand the claim now, thanks! I still don't know if Benatar needs to accept the Fundamental Asymmetry. Do you think he's committed to it? Does Benatar need to say that pain has intrinsic disvalue even if no one exists to experience it, in order to be able to say that it's better for a possible person that they aren't existing and feeling pain?
I think the four propositions you set out as part of his "response to Brill" are collectively equivalent to the Fundamental Asymmetry. (One could imagine an alternative view which spoke purely of "goodness for", not intrinsic value/disvalue, but such a view would struggle to explain the comparative goodness of preventing miserable life, since in the empty world there is nobody for whom it is comparatively better.)
I agree that alternative view would struggle for the reason you say, but to me, that seems to be the route Benatar goes. In "Better Never to Have Been," he seems to endorse the alternative view on p. 4 and p. 31. In "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics," he seems to endorse the alternative view in greater detail, on pages 125–6.
On pages 41-42 of the digital version of "Better Never to Have Been," Benatar says that the not-badness of the absence of pleasure for the never existent is a comparative not-badness rather than an intrinsic one, and that the badness of the absence of pleasure for the existent is a comparative rather intrinsic badness. This strongly implies that the absence of pain for the never-existent is a purely comparative goodness rather than an intrinsic one, but that requires reading between the lines. I'm not sure if he's more clear about this elsewhere in "Better Never to Have Been." But, again, he is clear about this in his response to Brill.
In his response to Brill, he endorses the following:
1) pain is intrinsically bad
2) pleasure is intrinsically good
3) the absence of pain for the never-existent is intrinsically neutral and is better than the presence of pain for the existent
4) the absence of pleasure for the never existent is intrinsically neutral and is not worse than the presence of pleasure for the existent
This is how he should have written his asymmetry from the beginning. It would have avoided a lot of confusion.
This article rather elegantly refutes Benatar's asymmetry. Definitely worth checking out.
https://fortheloveofwisdom.net/952/ethics/the-double-standard-behind-benatars-asymmetry-argument-for-anti-natalism/
I think this article provides a great critique of Benatar's asymmetry.
https://fortheloveofwisdom.net/952/ethics/the-double-standard-behind-benatars-asymmetry-argument-for-anti-natalism/
No, that reply just seems to bite the bullet, brutely asserting disagreement while citing a bunch of fellow-travellers whose theories commit them to doing likewise. It offers no actual *reason* to deny my "Awesome Lives" premise.