I think the four propositions you set out as part of his "response to Brill" are collectively equivalent to the Fundamental Asymmetry. (One could imagine an alternative view which spoke purely of "goodness for", not intrinsic value/disvalue, but such a view would struggle to explain the comparative goodness of preventing miserable life, …
I think the four propositions you set out as part of his "response to Brill" are collectively equivalent to the Fundamental Asymmetry. (One could imagine an alternative view which spoke purely of "goodness for", not intrinsic value/disvalue, but such a view would struggle to explain the comparative goodness of preventing miserable life, since in the empty world there is nobody for whom it is comparatively better.)
I agree that alternative view would struggle for the reason you say, but to me, that seems to be the route Benatar goes. In "Better Never to Have Been," he seems to endorse the alternative view on p. 4 and p. 31. In "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics," he seems to endorse the alternative view in greater detail, on pages 125–6.
I think the four propositions you set out as part of his "response to Brill" are collectively equivalent to the Fundamental Asymmetry. (One could imagine an alternative view which spoke purely of "goodness for", not intrinsic value/disvalue, but such a view would struggle to explain the comparative goodness of preventing miserable life, since in the empty world there is nobody for whom it is comparatively better.)
I agree that alternative view would struggle for the reason you say, but to me, that seems to be the route Benatar goes. In "Better Never to Have Been," he seems to endorse the alternative view on p. 4 and p. 31. In "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics," he seems to endorse the alternative view in greater detail, on pages 125–6.