If pain has unconditional intrinsic disvalue, as the Fundamental Asymmetry claims, then it follows that the *absence* of pain -- as the absence of an unconditional intrinsic bad -- is *comparatively* good, which is just what Benatar also holds.
I don't think anyone here is claiming that the absence of pain is intrinsically (non-comparatively) good -- that would be a bizarre claim.
If pain has unconditional intrinsic disvalue, as the Fundamental Asymmetry claims, then it follows that the *absence* of pain -- as the absence of an unconditional intrinsic bad -- is *comparatively* good, which is just what Benatar also holds.
I don't think anyone here is claiming that the absence of pain is intrinsically (non-comparatively) good -- that would be a bizarre claim.
Okay, I think I understand the claim now, thanks! I still don't know if Benatar needs to accept the Fundamental Asymmetry. Do you think he's committed to it? Does Benatar need to say that pain has intrinsic disvalue even if no one exists to experience it, in order to be able to say that it's better for a possible person that they aren't existing and feeling pain?
I think the four propositions you set out as part of his "response to Brill" are collectively equivalent to the Fundamental Asymmetry. (One could imagine an alternative view which spoke purely of "goodness for", not intrinsic value/disvalue, but such a view would struggle to explain the comparative goodness of preventing miserable life, since in the empty world there is nobody for whom it is comparatively better.)
I agree that alternative view would struggle for the reason you say, but to me, that seems to be the route Benatar goes. In "Better Never to Have Been," he seems to endorse the alternative view on p. 4 and p. 31. In "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics," he seems to endorse the alternative view in greater detail, on pages 125тАУ6.
If pain has unconditional intrinsic disvalue, as the Fundamental Asymmetry claims, then it follows that the *absence* of pain -- as the absence of an unconditional intrinsic bad -- is *comparatively* good, which is just what Benatar also holds.
I don't think anyone here is claiming that the absence of pain is intrinsically (non-comparatively) good -- that would be a bizarre claim.
Okay, I think I understand the claim now, thanks! I still don't know if Benatar needs to accept the Fundamental Asymmetry. Do you think he's committed to it? Does Benatar need to say that pain has intrinsic disvalue even if no one exists to experience it, in order to be able to say that it's better for a possible person that they aren't existing and feeling pain?
I think the four propositions you set out as part of his "response to Brill" are collectively equivalent to the Fundamental Asymmetry. (One could imagine an alternative view which spoke purely of "goodness for", not intrinsic value/disvalue, but such a view would struggle to explain the comparative goodness of preventing miserable life, since in the empty world there is nobody for whom it is comparatively better.)
I agree that alternative view would struggle for the reason you say, but to me, that seems to be the route Benatar goes. In "Better Never to Have Been," he seems to endorse the alternative view on p. 4 and p. 31. In "Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics," he seems to endorse the alternative view in greater detail, on pages 125тАУ6.