On pages 41-42 of the digital version of "Better Never to Have Been," Benatar says that the not-badness of the absence of pleasure for the never existent is a comparative not-badness rather than an intrinsic one, and that the badness of the absence of pleasure for the existent is a comparative rather intrinsic badness. This strongly impl…
On pages 41-42 of the digital version of "Better Never to Have Been," Benatar says that the not-badness of the absence of pleasure for the never existent is a comparative not-badness rather than an intrinsic one, and that the badness of the absence of pleasure for the existent is a comparative rather intrinsic badness. This strongly implies that the absence of pain for the never-existent is a purely comparative goodness rather than an intrinsic one, but that requires reading between the lines. I'm not sure if he's more clear about this elsewhere in "Better Never to Have Been." But, again, he is clear about this in his response to Brill.
In his response to Brill, he endorses the following:
1) pain is intrinsically bad
2) pleasure is intrinsically good
3) the absence of pain for the never-existent is intrinsically neutral and is better than the presence of pain for the existent
4) the absence of pleasure for the never existent is intrinsically neutral and is not worse than the presence of pleasure for the existent
This is how he should have written his asymmetry from the beginning. It would have avoided a lot of confusion.
On pages 41-42 of the digital version of "Better Never to Have Been," Benatar says that the not-badness of the absence of pleasure for the never existent is a comparative not-badness rather than an intrinsic one, and that the badness of the absence of pleasure for the existent is a comparative rather intrinsic badness. This strongly implies that the absence of pain for the never-existent is a purely comparative goodness rather than an intrinsic one, but that requires reading between the lines. I'm not sure if he's more clear about this elsewhere in "Better Never to Have Been." But, again, he is clear about this in his response to Brill.
In his response to Brill, he endorses the following:
1) pain is intrinsically bad
2) pleasure is intrinsically good
3) the absence of pain for the never-existent is intrinsically neutral and is better than the presence of pain for the existent
4) the absence of pleasure for the never existent is intrinsically neutral and is not worse than the presence of pleasure for the existent
This is how he should have written his asymmetry from the beginning. It would have avoided a lot of confusion.
This article rather elegantly refutes Benatar's asymmetry. Definitely worth checking out.
https://fortheloveofwisdom.net/952/ethics/the-double-standard-behind-benatars-asymmetry-argument-for-anti-natalism/
I think this article provides a great critique of Benatar's asymmetry.
https://fortheloveofwisdom.net/952/ethics/the-double-standard-behind-benatars-asymmetry-argument-for-anti-natalism/