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I discuss the same asteroid case at the end of this GPI working paper (p. 24): globalprioritiesinstitu… Probability discounters might respond with something like "collective difference-making": One ought to take into account the choices of other people and consider whether the collective has a non-negligible probability of making a difference.
I discuss the same asteroid case at the end of this GPI working paper (p. 24): https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/tiny-probabilities-and-the-value-of-the-far-future-petra-kosonen/ Probability discounters might respond with something like "collective difference-making": One ought to take into account the choices of other people and consider whether the collective has a non-negligible probability of making a difference.
Thanks for the reference!
I think the dialectic is similar to Parfit's famous objections to anti-aggregation:
https://www.philosophyetc.net/2012/10/parfit-on-aggregation-and-iteration.html
While it's true that the targeted view might secure the right verdict in this case by appeal to something like collective difference-making, the larger point is that the *motivation* for their view is decisively undermined one we see that it is clearly "worth it" to perform the individual action simply on the grounds that:
(i) it is worth it for everyone to do the action in question
(ii) the value of each act is equal and independent, and does not depend upon how many others act likewise
(iii) If a set of acts are jointly worth doing, and are of equal and independent value, then each is individually worth doing.