Okay but surely it would still be bad for happy people to die if A-theory was true? I also think you could make a parallel version of the argument with time slices:
1) for something to be good it must benefit someone at some time.
2) for something to benefit someone at some time they must be better off at that time than they would have otherwise been.
3) revising someone doesn't make someone better off than they would have otherwise been at some time because they wouldn't have otherwise been at that time.
so reviving someone is good.
What's wrong with that argument is the same as what's wrong with the original argument for the asymmetry.
For eternalists about time, dead people exist, just at an earlier time. There's no metaphysical difficulty in referring to them (de re), for example.
Okay but surely it would still be bad for happy people to die if A-theory was true? I also think you could make a parallel version of the argument with time slices:
1) for something to be good it must benefit someone at some time.
2) for something to benefit someone at some time they must be better off at that time than they would have otherwise been.
3) revising someone doesn't make someone better off than they would have otherwise been at some time because they wouldn't have otherwise been at that time.
so reviving someone is good.
What's wrong with that argument is the same as what's wrong with the original argument for the asymmetry.