So there is a presumption that the decision is being made within an institutional structure that preserves the moral agency of the participants. But… this is framed in consequentialist, not deontological terms, and then the constraints this imposes are not addressed within the analysis. This could be explained in a couple of ways, either…
So there is a presumption that the decision is being made within an institutional structure that preserves the moral agency of the participants. But… this is framed in consequentialist, not deontological terms, and then the constraints this imposes are not addressed within the analysis. This could be explained in a couple of ways, either that the safeguards embedded in the process are so reliable that we can feel confident that no solution will be implemented that violates them, or that we don’t need safeguards. I think this ambiguity has made me uncomfortable.
I'm presuming the former, and find it weird that you find this "ambiguous". It would never occur to me, in reading a philosopher argue that we (society) should do X, to imagine that they mean we should impose a dictator who will do X against everyone else's will. That's just a ridiculously uncharitable reading of any ordinary moral-political argument.
For future reference, whenever I am arguing for a policy, you should take it as given that I am arguing for it to be implemented via the usual democratic processes.
P.S. Footnote 4 explicitly notes that I take my arguments here to be compatible with deontology.
Well, it’s a bit of a pet peeve with me. I don’t see the usual processes as particularly democratic. The US has weak safeguards, and philosophers tend to ignore this. A solution that depends on the existence of an adequately non-corrupt state doesn’t make a lot of sense in an environment that lacks this prerequisite. it is much easier to imagine a benevolent dictator than to deal with the actual obstacles to implementation.
I didn’t understand footnote 4, so I am not sure what it means to be compatible with deontology here.
So there is a presumption that the decision is being made within an institutional structure that preserves the moral agency of the participants. But… this is framed in consequentialist, not deontological terms, and then the constraints this imposes are not addressed within the analysis. This could be explained in a couple of ways, either that the safeguards embedded in the process are so reliable that we can feel confident that no solution will be implemented that violates them, or that we don’t need safeguards. I think this ambiguity has made me uncomfortable.
I'm presuming the former, and find it weird that you find this "ambiguous". It would never occur to me, in reading a philosopher argue that we (society) should do X, to imagine that they mean we should impose a dictator who will do X against everyone else's will. That's just a ridiculously uncharitable reading of any ordinary moral-political argument.
For future reference, whenever I am arguing for a policy, you should take it as given that I am arguing for it to be implemented via the usual democratic processes.
P.S. Footnote 4 explicitly notes that I take my arguments here to be compatible with deontology.
Well, it’s a bit of a pet peeve with me. I don’t see the usual processes as particularly democratic. The US has weak safeguards, and philosophers tend to ignore this. A solution that depends on the existence of an adequately non-corrupt state doesn’t make a lot of sense in an environment that lacks this prerequisite. it is much easier to imagine a benevolent dictator than to deal with the actual obstacles to implementation.
I didn’t understand footnote 4, so I am not sure what it means to be compatible with deontology here.