Also relevant is Frances Kamm's discussion of the harm of death in "Creation and Abortion" (which I believe I mentioned to you in an email years ago, in response to Value Receptacles). She also argues that it's not worth preventing short, "experientially adequate" lives from coming into existence even if they quickly die and so are depri…
Also relevant is Frances Kamm's discussion of the harm of death in "Creation and Abortion" (which I believe I mentioned to you in an email years ago, in response to Value Receptacles). She also argues that it's not worth preventing short, "experientially adequate" lives from coming into existence even if they quickly die and so are deprived of a lot, because death is not the sort of harm that makes it better to never exist and have nothing (and be deprived of nothing) rather than to briefly exist and have a little bit and be deprived of a lot. If death's harm is the comparative deprivation of good things, it doesn't help anything to fail to create someone so they can avoid deprivation, since this does not increase the amount of absolute goods being enjoyed.
Also relevant is Frances Kamm's discussion of the harm of death in "Creation and Abortion" (which I believe I mentioned to you in an email years ago, in response to Value Receptacles). She also argues that it's not worth preventing short, "experientially adequate" lives from coming into existence even if they quickly die and so are deprived of a lot, because death is not the sort of harm that makes it better to never exist and have nothing (and be deprived of nothing) rather than to briefly exist and have a little bit and be deprived of a lot. If death's harm is the comparative deprivation of good things, it doesn't help anything to fail to create someone so they can avoid deprivation, since this does not increase the amount of absolute goods being enjoyed.