I’m trying to put my finger on the reason the point about relative and absolute harms seems so unimportant to me. The post discusses morality. But it never mentions consent. I see consent as central, but not determinative. Every moral theory has implications regarding consent, or premises about it. The usual approach of this blog dismiss…
I’m trying to put my finger on the reason the point about relative and absolute harms seems so unimportant to me. The post discusses morality. But it never mentions consent.
I see consent as central, but not determinative. Every moral theory has implications regarding consent, or premises about it. The usual approach of this blog dismisses extreme interpretations of utilitarianism, but this depends on this all working out somehow. But does it?
I'm not sure what you mean. I'm primarily interested here in the moral assessment of large-scale policies like whether to ban (even humane) animal farming, or the development of sentient AI. Where would consent enter the picture? Beings can't consent to being created. The best we can do is ask whether we could *expect* that they would subsequently grant their retrospective consent, if we were to bring them into existence under such-and-such conditions. But that presumably reduces to the question of whether their existence is good for them, or has positive welfare value. (At least, I'm not sure what other basis there would be for making a prediction either way.)
Consent enters the picture if there is not unanimity regarding the policy. A justification for imposing “the best” on unwilling participants is perhaps implicit.I want to make it explicit.
When are we justified in imposing a policy on unwilling persons? What effect does it have on them to treat moral agents as if they had no such agency? How much confidence in our judgement must we have before we are justified in overruling either democratic or personal choices?
Beings can't consent to being created. In the ideal circumstance, their creators act as their proxies, and perhaps they ask whether they could *expect* that their creations would subsequently grant their retrospective consent. What would they owe their creations if they miscalculate, or if they use some other criteria? If they abuse their creations, they are accountable as in other cases where a moral patient's rights are violated. But what would they owe for the act of creating them under mistaken or poorly judged expectations?
I responded to this earlier, but I think my internet connection swallowed it. If it shows up later, I hope I can delete one of them.
I’m trying to put my finger on the reason the point about relative and absolute harms seems so unimportant to me. The post discusses morality. But it never mentions consent.
I see consent as central, but not determinative. Every moral theory has implications regarding consent, or premises about it. The usual approach of this blog dismisses extreme interpretations of utilitarianism, but this depends on this all working out somehow. But does it?
I'm not sure what you mean. I'm primarily interested here in the moral assessment of large-scale policies like whether to ban (even humane) animal farming, or the development of sentient AI. Where would consent enter the picture? Beings can't consent to being created. The best we can do is ask whether we could *expect* that they would subsequently grant their retrospective consent, if we were to bring them into existence under such-and-such conditions. But that presumably reduces to the question of whether their existence is good for them, or has positive welfare value. (At least, I'm not sure what other basis there would be for making a prediction either way.)
Consent enters the picture if there is not unanimity regarding the policy. A justification for imposing “the best” on unwilling participants is perhaps implicit.I want to make it explicit.
When are we justified in imposing a policy on unwilling persons? What effect does it have on them to treat moral agents as if they had no such agency? How much confidence in our judgement must we have before we are justified in overruling either democratic or personal choices?
Beings can't consent to being created. In the ideal circumstance, their creators act as their proxies, and perhaps they ask whether they could *expect* that their creations would subsequently grant their retrospective consent. What would they owe their creations if they miscalculate, or if they use some other criteria? If they abuse their creations, they are accountable as in other cases where a moral patient's rights are violated. But what would they owe for the act of creating them under mistaken or poorly judged expectations?
I responded to this earlier, but I think my internet connection swallowed it. If it shows up later, I hope I can delete one of them.